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1. Introduction: The Politics of Subsidiarity 
Subsidiarity is one of the core organising principles of the European Union (EU) and can be 
considered from legal, political and administrative perspectives. Legally, the subsidiarity 
principle, as laid down in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), determines 
whether action should be taken at the European level or at state level, thus helping to settle 
disputes concerning the division of competences.1 The procedures to monitor compliance 
with subsidiarity are set out in Protocol No. 2, with national parliaments at the forefront. 
Politically, subsidiarity relates to a wide variety of instances, in some of which the member 
states make demands of, and in others voice reservations about, supranational authorities, 
pointing to the desirability of more extensive EU policies in some areas and less in others. In 
terms of administrative adaptations, the European Commission and national parliaments 
have invested in procedures to apply more consistently certain regulatory principles 
(including subsidiarity and proportionality) in political decisions.2 In combination, these 
                                                   
1 P. Craig and G. De Búrca (2011), EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
fifth edition; and P. Craig (2012), “Subsidiarity: A political and legal analysis”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 50, No. S1, pp. 72–87. 
2 A. Schout and J. Sleifer (2014), “A Public Administration Take on Legitimacy: Better Regulation as 
Multilevel Governance Challenge”, in m; Ambrus, K. Arts, E. Hey and H. Raulus (eds), The Role of 
‘Experts’ in International Decision-Making: Advisors, Decision-Makers or Irrelevant, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
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approaches have gone a long way towards facilitating the practical application of the thorny 
legal concept of subsidiarity since its introduction in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.  
The first twenty years of subsidiarity were about gaining wide acceptance for it as a political, 
legal and administrative tenet. Phase two in the development of the principle is about 
exploring possibilities for deepening and fine-tuning its application. For different reasons, 
the search for practical applicability of subsidiarity resonates in member states and EU 
institutions. The first wave of subsidiarity debates occurred around 1990 with the efforts to 
‘complete the internal market’. 3  The current, phase-two debates are connected to the 
deepening of European integration and the growing popular concerns this has provoked 
regarding democratic legitimacy, the perception of centralisation and the threat of an 
omnipresent EU.4 
This paper explores the political and practical relevance of some of the ideas currently being 
considered to solidify the principle of subsidiarity in day-to-day decision-making.5 Section 
two maps the current political contours of subsidiarity as they appear in speeches and policy 
papers. The third section reflects the discussion on some of the main ideas in the current 
debate on deepening subsidiarity. The conclusions finalise the paper.  
The outcome of this exploration of the current state of play is that there is broad political 
support for deepening the application of subsidiarity. It is also evident that a lot has already 
been achieved in the creation of tools to support subsidiarity, such as better annual 
planning, impact assessments and efforts to involve national parliaments. Another finding is 
that much can be done ‘à droit constant’ – that is, within the given legal frameworks and 
procedures. Yet, there are also serious concerns about putting subsidiarity into practice and 
respecting self-restraint when formulating EU policies. Member states’ governments and 
national parliaments have difficulties being proactive in providing information to the 
Commission concerning the costs and benefits of new initiatives. Moreover, the Council, 
Commission and European Parliament seem to lose their focus on smarter regulation in the 
course of their trialogues. Evidently, more can still be done to enhance EU policy and self-
restraint, but the political momentum and the basic legal and organisational preconditions 
are well established by now. The time seems ripe for addressing the challenges of phase two: 
deepening the practical application of the principle of subsidiarity.  
2. Political Balance of Interests 
The notion of subsidiarity – with varying degrees of backing –has once again become a 
prominent theme on the EU’s agenda, propelled by a multitude of challenges, including 
eroding EU legitimacy, the need for better EU output, insecurity over deepening economic 
integration, the feeling that European regulation is sometimes overly burdensome and a 
                                                   
3 M; Wilke and H. Wallace (1990), Subsidiarity: Approaches to Power-sharing in the European Community, 
London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
4 Craig, “Subsidiarity: A political and legal analysis”, op. cit. 
5 On 23 January 2014, a group of 73 member states’ officials and representatives from the European 
institutions and academia gathered at Clingendael Park in The Hague for a day-long seminar co-
organised by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations and CEPS for the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. The seminar’s aim was to discuss whether subsidiarity can offer a 
way forward that reconciles the need for better EU governance with concerns about legitimacy. This 
paper is based on subsidiarity literature, on preparatory talks with officials from member states and 
EU institutions and on the discussions in the seminar in The Hague. The discussions and interviews 
were held under the Chatham House rule. 
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rising concern about the growing distance between the public and EU decisions. Still, 
member states and EU institutions place different emphases and have varying priorities 
within this debate, and commitment varies. Considering both its legal and political bases, 
European Commission President José Manuel Barroso remarked that subsidiarity is not a 
luxury but an obligation.6 After a pro-federalist national campaign for the Social Democratic 
Party of Germany in 2013, Martin Schulz, the lead candidate for the Party of European 
Socialists in the European Parliament elections of 2014, stressed that subsidiarity is “about 
finding a more rational division of labour between the member states and the EU”.7 Several 
member states also voiced their wish for better EU governance, with the United Kingdom 
looking into ways to reduce bureaucracy with its ‘cut EU red tape’ reports and its attempt, 
which has met with mixed success, toward a rollback or improvement of ‘EU competences’8 
and with the call by (then) Prime Minister Enrico Letta of Italy and Prime Minister Jyrki 
Katainen of Finland for a reduction in the administrative burden.9 Some countries, however, 
seem to prefer more detailed EU law, so that legislation can simply be adopted without 
further demands on limited national legislative capacities. The overriding principle in a 
subsidiarity exercise conducted by the Netherlands in 2013 was “European where necessary, 
national where possible”.10 In these early discussions on rekindling the subsidiarity debate, 
other member states have not yet formulated an official government position on EU reform, 
some out of fear for steps that could lead toward treaty change and others simply because 
they have other priorities. Yet, overall, there seems to be support, whether actively or by 
acquiescence, for the concept.  
Subsidiarity has to be seen in a context that is wider than the definition of the appropriate 
administrative or regulatory level for action. Interviews with experts and officials have 
revealed that at times a narrower and at other times a more inclusive view of subsidiarity is 
applied in practice. Subsidiarity is inherently connected to debates on smarter regulation, 
deregulation, improving the democratic accountability of EU policies and institutional 
equilibrium. In any case, the overall objective of better regulation11 is regarded as central, 
                                                   
6  José Manuel Durão Barroso (2013), “From 1946 till Today – A European Success Story: Why 
Leadership Matters”, SPEECH/13/900, European Commission, 8 November. 




8 M; Emerson and S. Blockmans (2013), “British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part I: ‘Competences 
About Right, So Far’”, European Policy Institutes Network Working Paper No. 35, CEPS, Brussels, 
October; A. Schout and J. M. Wiersma (2014), “Britain and the Netherlands: Similar Concerns but 
Different Approaches in Reforming the EU”, in A. Hug (ed.), Renegotiation, Reform and Referendum: 
Does Britain Have an EU Future?, London: Foreign Policy Centre, February 2014. 
9 J. Katainen and E. Letta (2013), “Die EU-Rechtsetzung vereinfachen”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
18 October.  
10  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands (2013), Uitkomsten subsidiariteitsexercitie, MINBUZA-
2013.184321, 21 June.  
11 European Commission (2002), European Governance: Better Lawmaking, COM(2002) 275 final, 
Brussels; European Commission (2006), Better Lawmaking 2005, COM(2006) 289 final, Brussels; Council 
of the European Union (2006), Better Regulation – Handling of Impact Assessments, COMPET DS 
150/06, Brussels, 1 March. 
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whether that is achieved through subsidiarity, proportionality,12  the choice of the least 
disruptive instrument, deregulation or quality of output. Subsidiarity is a tool to provide 
more focus to EU policies and thus to render them more effective, but in itself the principle 
is insufficient to forge a constructive European reform agenda. 
The need for EU reform is broadly felt. Nevertheless, some general parameters of the reform 
debate seem clear. Reform should preferably take place within the limits of the current 
treaties (also with a view to delivering results in the short run), the ‘Community method’ 
(the outline of how supranational powers are distributed among the main institutions in the 
cycle of EU decision-making) should not be undermined and there should be no repatriation 
of competences. Similarly, more EU powers are needed in certain policy areas, for example, 
to strengthen the economic, banking and monetary unions. In the meantime, a better-run 
European Union may imply a sharper prioritisation of policies where possible.  
Tensions between collective interests and diversity of national practices and preferences 
often surface in the negotiations between EU institutions and member states. There exists a 
widely shared impression that the European Commission and European Parliament are 
more inclined toward action at the EU level to attain Union-wide policy objectives. 
However, as the European Commission has often remarked, the Commission aims at 
producing lean proposals, but subsequent negotiations between the Council and European 
Parliament lead to all kinds of additions, details and qualifications.13 The three European 
institutions are bound by the Interinstitutional Agreement (2003)14 to respect the principles 
of better regulation and to pay attention to the impact assessments attached to legislative 
proposals. With the evolving role of national parliaments as guardians of subsidiarity, it is 
likely that the Commission’s motivations for regulatory initiatives will be scrutinised more 
thoroughly. The European Parliament has thus far had a limited active role in guarding the 
principle of subsidiarity.15 All submissions of reasoned opinions from national parliaments 
are dealt with in its Committee on Legal Affairs. Most of the input from national parliaments 
is considered a ‘contribution’ and not a ‘reasoned opinion’, as it is not considered to include 
substantive subsidiarity claims.16  
                                                   
12 Under this rule, the involvement of the institutions must be limited to what is necessary to achieve 
the objectives of the Treaties. In other words, the content and form of the action must be in keeping 
with the aim pursued. See article 5(4) TEU and Protocol No. 2 
13 Schout and Sleifer, “A Public Administration Take on Legitimacy”, op. cit. 
14  European Parliament, Council and Commission, Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-
making, 2003/C 321/01, OJ C 321, 31 December 2003. 
15 European Parliament rules of procedure state that the European Parliament shall pay “particular 
attention” to respect for the principle of subsidiarity. The Secretariat of the European Parliament 
includes a directorate for ‘Impact Assessments and European Added Value’, screening the impact 
assessments of the European Commission in order to identify obvious strengths and weaknesses to 
support the legislative work in the committees.  
16 According to the latest “State of Play on Reasoned Opinions and Contributions submitted by 
National Parliaments under Protocol No. 2 of the Lisbon Treaty” of March 2014, the European 
Parliament has received a total of 1.662 submissions from national parliaments. Of these, 282 are 
reasoned opinions, while the remaining 1.410 are contributions. Compared with the European 
Commission, the official numbers for the European Parliament regarding reasoned opinions are 
lower. ‘Reasoned opinions’ are defined as submissions that indicate the non-compliance of a draft 
legislative act with the principle of subsidiarity and have been communicated to the European 
Parliament within the eight-week deadline referred to in Article 6 of Protocol No 2 of the Treaty of 
Lisbon. ‘Contributions’ indicate any other submissions that do not fulfil the criteria listed above for a 
reasoned opinion. 
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3. Practical Proposals for Better EU Governance  
The discussions over subsidiarity in its more inclusive dimension have resulted in a large 
variety of practical suggestions for deepening its application (see the Annex). Many 
proposals have been raised, ranging from new institutional structures to refinement of 
existing procedures. Proposals such as the creation of an independent subsidiarity court 
(which, unlike the European Court of Justice, would not be related to the objective of an 
ever-closer union),17 limiting the powers of the European Commission or reducing its size, 
fall outside the scope of the practical steps considered here. Such alternatives demand treaty 
changes or are unfeasible in the near future because, for example, the number of 
commissioners has already been settled on until 2019.  
What follows addresses only the practical measures, as they have emerged in discussions 
and interviews. The suggestions relate to the national perspectives on reform (national 
parliaments and the involvement of national administrations), the EU institutions and, 
naturally, cooperation between the national and EU levels. Still, this leaves ample room for 
adjustments and improvements.  
3.1 European Level 
In his State of the Union speech of 2013, referring to a growing concern for a more focused 
EU, European Commission President Barroso argued that the EU “needs to be big on big 
things and smaller on smaller things”. Moreover, he added that the EU “needs to show it 
has the capacity to set both positive and negative priorities”.18 Public worries over ‘creeping 
competences’ or avoidable administrative burdens resulting from EU regulation have found 
receptive ears within the Commission and have fuelled efforts at greater subsidiarity and 
better regulation. Given the Commission’s right of initiative in accordance with the 
‘Community method’ and its advanced analysis of the application of the subsidiarity 
principle in performing impact assessments, the EU’s self-restraint and content analysis start 
with that executive body. Most efforts at the European level are directed toward regulatory 
reform and not specifically toward a better application of the subsidiarity principle. Yet, 
subsidiarity is instrumental in contributing to the better regulation objectives of the EU.  
Member states routinely express support for the REFIT (Regulatory Fitness and 
Performance)–type programmes set up by the Commission to revisit periodically the stock 
of regulation in order to detect restraints on competiveness and the functioning of the single 
market, with the aim of improving the EU’s regulatory appropriateness, including 
respecting the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Such programmes have already 
been going on under different names over the past twenty years (although mostly 
concerning deregulation – not subsidiarity).19 There is, however, ample support for further 
rigorous assessments, including those specifically related to subsidiarity. 
The European Commission’s impact assessments are an important tool to achieve this goal. 
Member states have encouraged the Commission to pay more attention in the impact 
assessments to subsidiarity, competitiveness, effects on local circumstances and 
implementation and other costs. However, the knowledge to address these issues must also 
come from the national level since the quality of impact assessments depends on the 
                                                   
17 A. Browne and M. Persson (2011), The Case for European Localism, London: Open Europe, September.  
18  José Manuel Durão Barroso, “State of the Union Address 2013”, SPEECH/13/684, European 
Commission, 11 September (emphasis added).  
19 Schout and Sleifer, “A Public Administration Take on Legitimacy”, op. cit. 
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information that member states – as well as stakeholders – provide. The Commission has 
been stressing the need for feedback from the member states on subsidiarity, proportionality 
and administrative burdens at early stages of the legislative procedure, preferably after 
publication of its ‘roadmaps’ and during the consultation process. National parliaments can 
also use the consultation phase to present their opinions and air their particular concerns. 
This should help to avoid complications during the negotiations, the blocking of legislation 
at a later stage with a ‘yellow card’ (at least one-third of the national parliaments raise 
objections) and tight deadlines once the proposal is sent to the parliaments. Moreover, it 
would be beneficial if the Council of the EU and the European Parliament took more time to 
discuss the impact assessments, as well as the results of the consultation process, before 
moving to a political discussion during the first reading. 
There is a perceived disconnect between these early moments in the process, when mostly 
civil servants are involved, and the official negotiations, when the national and European 
politicians take command. To coordinate these stages, the Council could start discussions 
about Commission ideas earlier on (for example, on the basis of a white paper or the annual 
work plan).20  
Another way to achieve better regulation is by strengthening ex post facto control on 
subsidiarity and proportionality. Checks could be built in before the proposal is accepted, 
after changes have been inserted in the negotiations. Currently, if substantial changes are 
made to the legislative proposal during the negotiations in the first or second reading, the 
likely impacts of the final legislative act remain indeterminate, given that neither the Council 
nor the European Parliament provides a systematic analysis of those amendments. An 
additional check would, however, involve criticism of the political changes that had just 
been made to the proposal, and politicians have not responded enthusiastically to this 
alternative. Another option would be to undertake more systematic evaluations of policies. 
However, policies are already generally evaluated after three or five years, and REFIT-type 
programmes are also regularly scheduled.  
The Commission and European Parliament are perceived to suffer from a lack of self-
control. They should strive for the goals identified in the treaties and follow the European 
interests, but, at the same time, they must abide by the principle of subsidiarity. The 
Commission’s regulatory ambitions are considered high by member states, and doubts 
persist over its focus to initiate regulatory action in critical policy areas. However, 
Commission initiatives often originate from Council conclusions and demands from 
member states. One possibility for improving the dialogue over priorities and focus is to 
have an annual debate in the General Affairs Council (GAC) on the draft Commission 
working programme for the upcoming year, before it is published. This is not to say that the 
Council should define the priorities but it might help to create insights at an early stage in 
terms of needs and focal points – it would not alter the institutional balance. The European 
Parliament already has a similar procedure. Moreover, it would help member states (and 
hence national parliaments) to get engaged sooner.  
It is unlikely that the introduction of a ‘clean slate’ (or ‘discontinuity’ principle) for each 
incoming Commission would receive sufficient support from member states and the 
European Parliament. Alternatively, a check on unfinished Commission work and European 
institutions’ priorities could be considered at the start of the new Commission’s mandate. 
                                                   
20 A. Jordan and A. Schout (2006), The Coordination of European Governance: Exploring the Capacities of 
Networked Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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The Commission’s rules of procedure and those of the European Parliament as well21 
already offer a self-check at the start of each five-year term. Overall, member states do not 
wish to interfere with the Commission’s right of initiative or to make structural alterations in 
the inter-institutional balance of the Commission, Council and European Parliament.  
The measures discussed above concern the European institutions, though of course they also 
impose demands on member-state governments. Yet, there are also measures to be explored 
specifically at the national level. 
3.2 National Level 
A lot of attention is given to the role of national parliaments as co-guardians of the 
subsidiarity principle and as primary sources of European legitimacy. This has triggered 
discussions about the possibilities for better scrutiny of EU policies by national governments 
and for closer involvement of national parliaments in EU legislative procedures. Following 
the innovations introduced in the Lisbon Treaty, practical questions remain concerning how 
national parliaments can actually assume their enhanced role in EU decision-making and 
implementation. There is a perceived need among member state governments for the 
mobilisation of national parliaments and more education on their role in the EU legislative 
procedures to ensure better use of the powers and instruments available. More effective 
inter-parliamentary cooperation, both horizontally and vertically, and an exchange of best 
practices within the framework of the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union 
Affairs (COSAC) could be a starting point. 
To allow for closer ex ante scrutiny, the Commission could explain major initiatives in 
national parliaments – or in more detail in the Council – to trigger political reactions from 
national assemblies. Conversely, member states’ parliaments could be more proactive in 
calling on European commissioners to explain their plans and actions. To go one step 
further, binding mandates for national governments would engage parliaments more closely 
in EU policy shaping and make them co-responsible for the decisions taken in the Council. 
Moreover, national parliaments could engage in annual discussions on the Commission’s 
work programme and organise yearly subsidiarity debates on recent political agreements or 
the overall state of play in specific areas. The Commission would encourage national 
parliaments and other stakeholders to voice their concerns on subsidiarity, proportionality 
or other grounds at early (consultative) stages. These measures would not alter the 
institutional balance. 
The involvement of national parliaments has been complicated by political disincentives (it 
is hard for parliamentarians to be involved when negotiations among 28 states, the 
European Parliament and the Commission have yet to start and when decision-making 
could well still be two years away). Member states have also expressed disagreements over 
the question of whether the subsidiarity card should be considered. Moreover, member 
states have displayed inconsistent preferences with regard to subsidiarity because of 
government changes over time or shifting political priorities. A further complicating issue is 
that national parliaments have no scrutiny over the delegated powers of the Commission 
(‘comitology’). Practical and legal challenges to suggestions to grant them such oversight are 
inevitable. 
                                                   
21 According to the rules of procedure of the European Parliament, the Conference of Presidents at the 
first plenary of the new European Parliament also decides on the (dis)continuity of legislative files 
from the previous legislature. Traditionally, the Conference decides in favour of continuity. 
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The yellow card procedure is the most concrete tool for national parliaments to intervene in 
the EU legislative process, potentially blocking a Commission proposal. On the other hand, 
national parliaments have no tools to shape EU legislation in a positive manner. Even 
though the card threshold (one third of national parliaments) has only been reached twice, 
the Commission has formed the impression that the procedure is fairly successful, and 
expects parliaments to make more use of it. Yet, the yellow card option could also result in 
frustration. Even though there has been a gradual increase in reasoned opinions over recent 
years (34 in 2010, 64 in 2011 and 83 in 2012), there have been only nine Commission 
proposals that triggered six or more reasoned opinions from national parliaments, indicating 
that the concerns about subsidiarity – and also proportionality –vary greatly among national 
parliaments.22  Moreover, four chambers (the Swedish Riksdag, the French Sénat and the 
Dutch lower and upper chambers) are responsible for a disproportionate quantity of the 
reasoned opinions. A significant number of the reasoned opinions fail to justify a violation 
of the subsidiarity principle in the strict legal sense, rather focusing on the content of the 
legislative proposal, with concerns motivated by domestic politics.23 As such, the process is 
still ineffective and inefficient. 
To facilitate the yellow card procedure, the time frame could be expanded from eight to 
twelve weeks, the grounds for a reasoned opinion could be widened to include 
proportionality and the threshold could be lowered to one-quarter of all chambers (instead 
of one-third). These suggestions have triggered mixed reactions from member states and EU 
institutions, with the first idea resonating most among member states. In any case, giving 
parliaments more time could be obviated through earlier involvement by parliaments in 
decision-making, for example, on the basis of work plans and roadmaps.  
A specific concern among member-state governments and national parliaments regarding 
the yellow card procedure is the perceived lack of Commission response or substantial 
follow-up to the reasoned opinions. A few national parliaments also complain that the reply 
letters are sometimes worded too generally and do not properly deal with the specific 
objections raised.24 In the effort to create a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), the 
Commission might consider pushing through its proposal under the procedure of enhanced 
cooperation, thus ignoring the yellow card altogether. In a detailed explanation of its 
actions, the Commission noted that the reasoned opinions contained several arguments 
relating to the principle of proportionality, to policy choices unrelated to subsidiarity or to 
other policy or legal issues. It concluded that there is no breach of the principle of 
subsidiarity.25 Even though the threshold for the yellow card was reached, the political 
consequences are unclear. Overall, apart from more proactive involvement by national 
parliaments, there was little support for limiting the Commission’s right of initiative in 
                                                   
22 European Commission, Annual Report 2012 on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, COM(2013) 566 final, 
Brussels, 30.7.2013; Piedrafita, S. (2013), “EU Democratic Legitimacy and National Parliaments”, 
Essay No. 7, CEPS, Brussels, 25 November. 
23 S. Piedrafita and S. Blockmans (2014), Shifting EU Institutional Reform into High Gear: Report of the 
CEPS High-Level Group, CEPS, Brussels. 
24 COSAC Secretariat (2011), Sixteenth Bi-annual Report: Developments in European Union Procedures and 
Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny, Report presented to the XLVI Conference of Parliamentary 
Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union, Warsaw, 2-4 October 2011. 
25 European Commission, Communication to the European Parliament, the Council and the national 
parliaments on the review of the proposal for a Council regulation on the establishment of the 
European Public Prosecutor's Office with regard to the principle of subsidiarity, in accordance with 
Protocol No. 2, COM(2013) 851 final, Brussels, 27.11.2013. 
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relation to yellow cards – the political negotiations offer ample room to respond to the 
Commission, including the option, as in the EPPO case, to move forward with differentiated 
integration. 
There seems little appetite for the introduction of additional cards, such as the ‘red card’, 
giving national parliaments a veto, the ‘late card’, giving national parliaments an 
opportunity to block a proposal in a later phase of the legislative procedure, or the ‘green 
card’, allowing for a joint initiative by national parliaments.  
4. Conclusions: More Focus on Regulatory Quality in the Context of 
Better Governance 
Subsidiarity has once again risen to the top of the EU’s political agenda. The evolving 
political discussion has resulted in support (ranging from passive to more active 
endorsement) for the concept from member states and the EU Commission. The European 
Parliament has so far been relatively quiet about subsidiarity. A wide-ranging list of 
practical solutions has been suggested. One general conclusion from the debates is that there 
seems to be–to varying degrees of commitment – broad consensus for a generic and goal-
oriented approach to better EU legislation (including subsidiarity, proportionality, burden 
reduction, etc.). Second, putting subsidiarity into practice from 1992 onward has resulted in 
a range of mechanisms. The issue now seems to be how to make better use of these 
instruments and procedures. Third, the political signals emerging from the debates are that 
the EU should be more careful in formulating new policies and about going into 
(unnecessary) detail when formulating policies. This is a message to the Commission, 
Council and European Parliament alike.  
Many possible initiatives have been suggested, yet far-reaching proposals for the reform of 
legislative procedures or the functioning of the Commission do not find much favour 
because of questions of practical feasibility, treaty revision and institutional balance. Ideas 
about improving existing methods, ranging from the yellow card procedure to putting more 
effort into impact assessments, REFIT-type programmes, etc. are generally deemed to be a 
vital component of strengthening the legitimacy of EU policies. With European elections in 
the offing and the start of a new Commission term later in the year, the momentum of 2014 
can and should be used to intensify these discussions. 
Deepening subsidiarity will entail greater efficiency in existing procedures and continuation 
with deregulation-type programmes. Therefore, a great deal will depend on the ability of the 
member states (stakeholders, parliaments and administrations) in particular to provide 
input into the policy deliberation processes. Making subsidiarity (as broadly defined) work 
will require vigilance from all concerned. It will involve further investments of effort in the 
available procedures, for example, in the form of member states working together on impact 
assessments in the early phases of decision-making. Improving EU legislation will also 
demand resources and attention from national administrations. 
Finally, the very nature of subsidiarity calls for restraint. Regardless of the practical 
suggestions that politicians want to prioritise, the mind-set counts, too. The tenor of the 
current discussions indicates that all involved should be sensitive to the questions involved 
in screening EU policies for their rationale and the value they contribute. 
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Annex: Practical Ideas to Strengthen Subsidiarity and Improve Focus 
In addition to the call to make better use of existing subsidiarity tools, the following practical 
ideas for furthering subsidiarity are circulating. There is no rigid division between the 
European and national levels, and several ideas concern both. 
European Level 
 Introduce an annual subsidiarity debate in the General Affairs Council. The Council 
could hold discussions on the five-year working programme of the Commission, with 
annual follow-ups to discuss the working programme and inform the Commission on 
policy priorities in the Council.  
 Introduce a ‘discontinuity’ principle, whereby a new College of Commissioners ought to 
start with new proposals. It should be noted here that that the Commission’s rules of 
procedure already state that the Commission performs a self-check on the necessity of 
floating proposals.  
 Appoint a number of ‘core’ commissioners with initiating powers, instead of 28 
commissioners with law-making powers in 28 policy portfolios.  
 Give one of the commissioners a subsidiarity portfolio. 
 Include no unnecessary non-binding communications and recommendations from the 
Commission in areas where the treaties do not give the EU specific competence. 
 Negotiate a political agreement between the Council and the Commission (possibly 
involving the European Parliament as well), determining certain domains or certain 
issues where the European institutions will refrain from further initiatives. A closely 
related alternative is the idea of a moratorium, agreeing not to present new proposals in 
a specific area for a certain period. 
 Maximise member states’ involvement in all legislative procedures, including the 
processes of implementing acts, delegated acts or implementation and elaboration by EU 
agencies. 
 Establish a separate subsidiarity court to monitor EU legislation.  
 Encourage a proactive approach by EU and national legislators to prevent unintended 
interpretations by the European Court of Justice. 
 Act accordingly; in advancing rules, the EU should always be capable of citing a clear 
legal basis in the treaties. This basis should be concisely formulated and clearly related to 
the proposed action.  
 Reorient EU legislation; it should be less detailed or invasive but take a more goal-
oriented approach. There should be no micro-management of the EU. 
 Create the possibility to pause the legislative process in cases of major 
changes/amendments to give all involved the chance to (re)formulate a position.  
 Prevent the EU from intervening in an unjustified way while preserving the institutional 
equilibrium. 
 Ensure that the European Parliament, in taking advantage of its role in selecting the next 
Commission president, does not dictate the Commission’s agenda. 
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 Ensure better cooperation between the Commission and member states on the REFIT 
programme. 
 Undertake further work on impact assessments, with explicit information on 
implementation and other costs, both at the EU and national levels, and more focus on 
the fulfilment of the subsidiarity principle in impact assessments. 
 Undertake impact assessments by the Council and the European Parliament at the outset 
or during the legislative procedure after significant amendments. 
 Pay more attention to the subsidiarity test in the impact assessments by the Council and 
European Parliament at the start of the legislative procedure. 
 Take care in the impact assessments to foster a better balance between local 
circumstances in the member states and common European goals.  
 Reduce administrative and regulatory burdens for companies, first of all for small and 
medium-sized enterprises. Introduce criteria for whether EU legislation truly improves 
the internal market and competition. 
 Make better use of the roadmaps and consultation practice of the Commission, before a 
legislative proposal is published, to voice concerns about subsidiarity, proportionality or 
burdensome regulation. 
 Introduce ex post facto subsidiarity control on existing EU legislation to demonstrate 
whether subsidiarity was respected and to justify the necessity of EU legislative acts on a 
case-by-case basis. Both member states and the EU institutions should be involved.  
National Level 
 Introduce the ‘right’ for national parliaments to request clarification from commissioners 
regarding a proposal, communication or reaction to a reasoned opinion. Ensure better 
cooperation between national parliaments and the European Commission, especially 
when it comes to the yellow card procedure. 
 Ask the European Commission to respond to reasoned opinions from national 
parliaments in the yellow card procedure within eight weeks of submission. 
 Increase the effectiveness of the yellow card procedure by extending the grounds for 
reasoned opinions, in particular allowing proportionality arguments alongside 
subsidiarity objections.  
 Extend the time frame in the yellow card procedure to give national parliaments more 
time to submit reasoned opinions and coordinate among themselves. 
 Lower the threshold in the yellow card procedure from one-third to one-quarter of all 
parliamentary chambers of the member states. 
 Follow the example of the Danish scrutiny model and introduce a mandating system for 
national parliaments in ex ante control, making national parliaments policy shapers in the 
EU legislative procedure. 
 Organise an annual subsidiarity debate in national parliaments to consider current and 
proposed EU legislation. 
 Request that all member states make a list of subsidiarity concerns and perceived overly 
burdensome regulations. The Commission should collect all the input and process it. 
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 Mobilise and educate national parliaments to improve their involvement in existing EU 
procedures.  
 Intensify the monitoring of impact assessments at the national level. 
 Encourage better cooperation and coordination between national parliaments and 
governments. Governments could better explain their positions in the Council, so as to 
trigger a reaction from the national parliament. 
 Exchange best practices on approaches to subsidiarity and the use of the subsidiarity 
check by national parliaments. COSAC could be the right platform for such an 
information exchange.  
 Introduce an informal ‘red card’ for national parliaments, by proposing a political 
agreement that the Commission will use its discretion to withdraw legislation if one-
third of national parliaments raise subsidiarity objections. 
 Introduce a ‘late card’, giving national parliaments the opportunity to voice their 
concerns at a later stage of the ordinary legislative procedure. 
 Introduce a ‘green card’ for national parliaments, which would give them the option to 
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